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LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF CALIFORNIA'S DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: A FIELD GUIDE TO RECENT EFFORTS
GLENN SMITH* AND BRENDAN BAILEY**
Savvy reformers know they should learn from the past. Being
aware of what worked, and what did not work, can help reformers
avoid errors and position themselves for maximum success. Especially
useful is an awareness of the political dynamics and opposing
arguments contributing to past failures.
This Article seeks to enhance the ability of California-initiative-
process reformers to gain wisdom from the past by briefly, yet
comprehensively, reviewing recent proposals considered in the
California legislature. Specifically, this "field guide" to initiative-
reform seeks to orient interested travelers to relevant California
legislative exertions from 1997 to the present.' Although our
orientation is informed by the entire range of legislative proposals
within the dataset, we give special focus to bills proposing to enhance
initiative-process deliberation-the ability of voters to understand and
meaningfully deliberate about initiative proposals. We also
concentrate on two categories of initiative-reform legislation during
the period: the five reform proposals actually enacted into law, and the
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Political Science, University of California, San Diego. J.D. 1978, New York Univ.
School of Law; LL.M. 1979, Georgetown Univ. Law Center. The author wishes to
thank California Western School of Law Dean Steven Smith for his ongoing support
of this Article and of the author's broader research agenda on California initiative
reform, and other California Western colleagues for providing ongoing and useful
encouragement.
** B.A. with Honors, Policital Science and Economics, University of
California, San Diego. Since 2007, author Bailey has served as a Research Assistant
to Professor Smith on several projects relating to initiative reform.
1. The basis for this time frame and the rationale for this article's focus are
explained in Part I.A-B, infra.
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twenty-five initiative-reform proposals passing both legislative
houses, only to fall prey to gubernatorial veto.
Part I of this Article makes some initial observations about our
focus and methodology. In particular, Part I explains the criteria
developed to categorize initiative-reform proposals in terms of the
phase(s) of the initiative process they sought to impact, the effect (if
any) they would have on initiative-process deliberation, and the basis
on which governors vetoed them. Part II analyzes initiative-reform
proposals generally, and by specialized subsets, in terms of our
categorization system. Part III provides an update on the prospects for
initiative reform in the 2011-2012 legislative session and concludes by
underlining two main lessons reformers can learn from the last 14
years of efforts to improve California's direct democracy.
I. Focus AND METHODOLOGY
A. Legislative Route for Reforms
Many interesting initiative-reform proposals have been proposed
by think tanks and interest groups. (Indeed, the proposals of a leading
research and advocacy center, the Los-Angeles-based Center for
Governmental Studies, are addressed specifically in another collection
article.2) Initiative-reform proposals also appear periodically on the
ballot as provisions on proposed initiatives.3
2. Nora H. Kashani & Robert M. Stem, Making California's Initiative Process
More Deliberative, 47 CAL. W. L. REv. 311 (2011)
3. See Cal. Proposition 219: Ballot Measures. Application. Legislative
Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 65 (1998),
available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1998p.pdf, (amended the
California Constitution to prohibit initiative measures from excluding political
subdivisions from their provisions) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8); Cal.
Proposition 137: Initiative and Referendum Process. Initiative Constitutional
Amendment, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 130 (1990) available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot pdf/1990g.pdf (proposed to prohibit the
Legislature from enacting without voter approval any statute regulating the manner
in which initiative or referendum petitions are circulated, presented, certified or
submitted to voters); Cal. Proposition 9: Financial Disclosures and Limitations
Affecting Polictical Campaigns, Public Officials and Lobbyists-Other Matters.
Initiative, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 35 (1974), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotjpdf/1974p.pdf (required reports of receipts and
expenditures in campaigns for ballot measures, revising ballot pamphlet
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This Article focuses on legislative reform proposals, however, for
several reasons. First, although very minor initiative-process
improvements might be accomplished administratively, political and
legal considerations will likely mean that any significant reform
would amend or add to existing statutes on constitutional provisions.
Second, the fact that a reform proposal was officially introduced into a
legislative session is a measure of its political salience and visibility.
Further, a host of practical reasons suggest that, in the short term
at least, meaningful initiative reform will likely come from the
California legislature, as opposed to direct democracy itself. Whereas
voters generally support the initiative process, even as they have
specific complaints about it,4 the California State Legislature has an
additional incentive to reform the initiative process. Prime among
these reasons is that the Legislature may perceive the initiative process
as a threat to its authority. Direct democracy offers voters an
opportunity to participate in a competing process for enacting laws
(many of which are not amendable by the Legislature) and to limit
budgetary options by dictating spending and taxing policies.5
requirements, and providing sanctions for violations) (codified at CAL. Gov.
CODE.§§ 8100-91014); Cal. Proposition 12: Amendment of Laws Adopted by
Initiative, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 12-13 (1946), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1946g.pdf (codified at CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ lb); Cal. Proposition 17: Initiative, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 34-35
(1938), available at http://traynor.uchastings.eduballotpdf/1938g.pdf (codified as
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1); Cal. Proposition 4: Initiative, reprinted in California
Ballot Pamphlet 11-15 (1920), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/
ballotjpdf/1920g.pdf (proposed to increase the number of signatures of qualified
electors necessary for presenting an initiative petition to the Secretary of State)
(failed).
4. PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL, CALIFORNIANS AND THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 1
(2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTFInitiativeJTF.pdf (reporting 2008
survey in which 60% of Californians were "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied"
with "the way the initiative process is working in California today" and 62% believe
that the process is in need of major or minor changes).
5. See, e.g., Cal. Proposition 42: Transportation Congestion Improvement Act.
Allocation of Existing Motor Vehicle Fuel Sales and Use Tax Revenues for
Transportation Purposes Only. Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in
California Ballot Pamphlet 66 (2002), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/
ballot_pdf/2002p.pdf (required tax revenues from gasoline sales be used for public
transportation and road repair and improvement, unless the Legislature suspended
by a two-thirds vote) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. XIX, § B); Cal. Proposition 218:
3
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Finally, the Legislature appears to be a superior forum for
producing meaningful and practical initiative-process reform. Indeed,
there is an irony at play: some of the dynamics making the initiative
process less than meaningfully deliberative-that is, some of the very
problems initiative-process reforms might legitimately seek to solve-
make it a less than desirable forum for considering and approving
such reforms. California's direct democracy lacks a structure allowing
reform proponents to engage in meaningful deliberations with
interested parties, to alter their proposals in response to informed
feedback, or to compromise their proposals to achieve majority
approval. Further, initiative voters face significant difficulties in
transcending simplistic slogans and acquiring useful, nuanced
information about the merits of initiative proposals. This means that
the election debate on initiatives proposing initiative reform is
unlikely to go beyond simple attacks characterizing proponents as
trying to rob Californians of a cherished democratic option. 6
Voter Approval for Local Government Taxes. Limitations on Fees, Assessments and
Charges. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in California Ballot
Pamphlet 108-09 (1996), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/
ballotpdf/1996g.pdf (limited authority of local government to impose taxes and
property-related charges by requiring majority of voters approve increases and two-
thirds majority approve special taxes) (codified at CAL. CONST. arts. XIIIC &
XIIID); Cal. Proposition 98: School Funding. Initiative Constitutional Amendment
and Statute, reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 79, 127-28 (1988), available at
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1988g.pdf (mandated that, during normal
economic times, 40% of the state general fund be spent on kindergarten through
community-college education).
6. Another advantageous byproduct of focusing on legislative reform
proposals is that the legislative process has multiple stages of deliberation, which are
recorded. Most bills receive several hearings in both houses, and are amended
several times. The history of each bill is conveniently logged within the Official
California Legislative Database. This makes it academically practical to study the
deliberation process that influences a bill along the way, rather than studying ballot
measures or other initiative proposals whose drafting and amendments are hidden
from public record.
[Vol. 47262
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B. Methodology
1. Relevant Legislative Proposals
Most of the research presented in this Article began in 2007 as
background research for a broader effort to study deliberative
deficiencies in the California initiative process and develop an
innovative reform proposal.7 Through a keyword search in the Official
California Legislative Information database,8 all bills containing terms
relevant to the initiative process, including "initiative," "ballot
measure," "proposition," and "election" were located. We assumed
that the most recent dozen years of legislative activity would be the
most useful (and sufficiently representative) frame of reference; 9 as a
result, all legislative proposals from the 1997-1998 legislative session
until the first year of the 2007-2008 legislative session were
examined.
When the "More Deliberation?" collection offered an opportunity
to systematically analyze and write about this legislative-proposal
background research, the database was double-checked to ensure the
accuracy of the original researchlo and to include bills considered in
the 2009-2010 legislative session.
7. See Glenn C. Smith, Bringing More D (Deliberation!) to California's DD
(Direct Democracy): Enhancing Voter Understanding and Promoting Deliberation
through Informal Notice and Comment Procedures, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. (2011)
(forthcoming) (attaching as Appendix I, and commenting upon, Report of the
Initiative Reform Working Group (2008)).
8. OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO. DATABASE, http:/www.leginfo.ca.gov
(follow "Bill Information" hyperlink at bottom of page) (last visited June 6, 2011).
This is the most convenient source for systematically searching legislative
proposals. The website is organized by the two-year period of each legislative
session, and proposals can be searched by bill number, author, or key word. Unless
otherwise indicated, California Assembly Bills (A.B.), California Senate Bills
(S.B.), or proposed constitutional amendments originating in the Assembly (A.C.A.)
or the Senate (S.C.A.) can be accessed by bill number and legislative session from
the "Bill Information" link. Legislative Reports and Gubernatorial Veto Messages
pertaining to particular legislative proposals can be accessed in the same way.
9. This period reflects a variety of political, budgetary, and other dynamics
affecting initiative reform. Governors of both political parties and varying ideologies
held office during this period and diverse individual legislators and legislative
coalitions dealt with varying economic and social concerns.
10. This double-check was conducted through an additional search using the
5
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2. Categorization
As shown in the comprehensive listings of legislative proposals
presented in Appendices A through D, we categorized each relevant
proposal" through a variety of criteria. Some criteria are self-evident;
however the methodology behind several needs additional elaboration.
a. Initiative-Process Phase
The phase-affected variable identifies which phase or phases of
the initiative process a reform proposal would have affected (whether
by deliberate design or as an inevitable byproduct). Tracking this
variable shows which components of California's direct democracy
have seemed especially problematic to reformers. Distinguishing
proposals on this basis also permits a comparative analysis of whether
the success of reform efforts correlates to the initiative phase at issue.
If so, given the lack of success of recent efforts, this correlation might
suggest the strategic and substantive wisdom of shifting focus in the
future.
In coding the phase(s) of the initiative process to which proposals
applied, we employed four time frames: (1) the "pre-circulation"
phase when initiative proposals are drafted and presented to relevant
state officials for preliminary work, including circulating them to
voters via initiative petitions;12 (2) the "circulation" phase during
names of legislators on the California Assembly Committee on Elections and
Redistricting and the Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments
Senate Committee.
11. Most initiative-reform bills contained one focus and one main proposal.
Some reform bills, however, contained two or more separate proposals, each
intending to affect different aspects and phases of the initiative process.
Accordingly, the basic unit of analysis of most of this Article is the "initiative-
reform proposal," rather than the "bill."
Further, as with all legislative proposals, many of the initiative-process-reform
proposals introduced during the study period went through a variety of changes as
they wended their way through the legislative process. In order to account for the
main dynamics of this evolution, the original and final versions of these bills were
tracked as separate proposals. To keep the process manageable and the bill count
meaningful, however, legislative permutations between the initial and final phases
were generally ignored.
12. See Initiative Guide, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE (last revised Apr. 2011),
264 [Vol. 47
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which voters interact with initiative petitions and petition gatherers;
(3) the "election" phase in which voters learn about ballot-qualified
initiative proposals from the official ballot pamphlet, proponents and
opponents argue about the proposals, and public officials and media
outlets weigh in; and (4) the "post-election" phase, when voter-
approved initiatives may be subject to judicial challenge or further
legislative action. One complication was that a reform could apply to
more than one phase. For example, a vetoed 1998 reform bill (A.B.
188) sought to prevent funds solicited or received for one initiative
from being used to promote or defeat another initiative.13 A.B. 188
would have restricted the operations of the proponents of a subsequent
initiative in the "pre-circulation" (i.e. drafting), "circulation," and
"election" phases. 14
b. The Impact of Proposals on Initiative-Process Deliberation
In keeping with the theme of the "More Deliberation?" collection,
and this Article's own reform interests, we characterized reform
proposals based on whether they sought to enhance, or would have the
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/initiative-guide.htm (describing
details of pre-circulation phase from initial drafting of proposal, through submission
of draft to Attorney General for title, and summary, and fiscal impact analysis).
13. A.B. 188, 1998-1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (passed the second
house on Aug. 28, 2008).
14. Another example is S.B. 1208, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
S.B. 1208 passed the legislature in August 2008, but fell victim to gubernatorial veto
a month later. See Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to S.B .1208 (Sept.
28, 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08Ibill/sen/sb 1201-
1250/sb 1208 vt 20080928.html. S.B. 1208 would have made the Legislative
Analyst's Office (LAO) solely responsible for preparing estimates of the fiscal
implications of proposed initiatives. S.B. 1208. This would have departed from
existing law, which requires the LAO to share authority with a Joint Legislative
Budget Committee and the executive-branch Department of Finance. Veto Message
to S.B. 1208, supra; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9005(a)-(c) (West 2011). S.B.
1208 technically applied in the "pre-circulation" phase, because fiscal estimates are
prepared after draft initiative proposals are submitted and before they are circulated
for voter-petition signatures. But initiative fiscal estimates are included both on the
circulation petition and in the information provided in the voter pamphlet for
initiatives receiving the requisite signatures. ELEC. CODE § 9005(b). Thus, S.B.
1208's main effect would have been on information available to voters in the
"circulation" and "election" phases.
7
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effect of enhancing, public deliberation about initiative proposals.
This Article uses a basic three-tiered approach, erring on the side of
finding a deliberative impact when it was plausible to do so.
First, we classified proposals as having a primary effect on
deliberation if their purpose or effect was to (1) prompt more
deliberation between interested parties about initiative proposals," (2)
provide additional information to voters (or opinion leaders in a
position to provide information or "cues" to voters),16 or (3) enhance
the quality of information already provided.1 7 Next, we classified
proposals as having a secondary relationship to deliberation when
they enhanced the ability of voters to better use existing information,
15. An example is A.B. 1245, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). The
California Legislature passed A.B. 1245, but Governor Davis vetoed it in October
2003. See Gov. Gray Davis's Veto Message to A.B. 1245 (Oct. 14, 2003), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_1201-1250/ab_1245_vt_2003
1014.html. As explained more fully in Former Assembly Member John Laird's
essay in this collection, John Laird & Clyde Macdonald, AB 1245 of 2003 - An
Attempt at Modest Reform of California's Initiative Process, 47 CAL. W. L. REV.
301 (2011), the proposal would have required the pre-circulation posting of a draft
initiative measure "for a period of 30 days, during which the public would be
permitted to post comments concerning the measure." CAL. OFFICE LEG. COUNSEL,
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST FOR A.B. 1245 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab1201-1250/ab_1245_bill_
20030221_introduced.html.
16. Although perhaps not its primary purpose, A.B. 1245 would have
generated a "paper trail" of public comments on initiative drafts. This written public
commentary would have expanded the record available to voters and cue-givers
about the pros and cons of the draft proposal and given voters the opportunity to
take action to respond to objections and provide other useful clarifications. So, A.B.
1245 also qualifies as having a "primary effect" on deliberation by generating new
information.
17. An example is S.B. 1208, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). State
Senator Denise Ducheny, S.B. 1208's proponent, defended S.B. 1208 on the ground
that existing law's joint responsibility for fiscal estimates "can cause problems as it
may be difficult to resolve differences between the agencies, especially given the
relatively short time period to perform [the estimates]." Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B.
1208, Assemb. Comm. on Elections and Redistricting, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess.,
at 2 (June 24, 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/
sen/sb 1201-1250/sb 1208_cfa_20080623_114310_asm comm.html. Whatever the
internecine dynamics involved in joint versus sole authority, S.B. 1208 could have
altered the substance of fiscal information available as voters deliberate about
initiatives.
266 [Vol. 47
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including proposals to make information more accessible or proposals
enhancing the ability of voters to evaluate the credibility of
information provided by proponents or other opinion leaders during
circulation or election phases.' 8
Finally, we deemed other proposals to have no meaningful
connection to deliberation-even if, by improving the integrity of an
initiative phase or the process generally they might in some diffuse
way enhance deliberation. For example, an attenuated causation chain
could connect the popular reform goal of requiring initiative-petition
circulators to disclose that they are paid signature-gatherers1 9 to
improved deliberation during the "circulation" phase. Arguably,
voters wary of paid gatherers might discount the gatherer's statements
about a proposed initiative or be more interested in independently
reading the information on the petition or seeking additional
information. This could lead to better voter deliberation, or at least
withholding non-deliberative, knee-jerk assent.20 However, counting
18. See, e.g., S.B. 1202, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (passed by
legislature on Aug. 30, 2010; vetoed by Governor Sept. 23, 2010) (requiring top five
contributors of $50,000 or more to initiative campaign to be listed in voter
pamphlet); S.B. 1598, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (passed by legislature
on Aug. 29, 2006; vetoed by Governor Sept. 29, 2006) (requiring voter petition to
state top five contributors to initiative campaign); S.B. 469, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2005) (passed by legislature on Sept. 7, 2005; vetoed by Governor Oct. 7,
2005) (requiring voter petition to reflect whether it is being circulated by a "paid
circulator").
19. See infra text accompanying note 48.
20. But see Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to S.B. 469 (Oct. 7,
2005), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0451-
0500/sb 469 vt 20051007.html (expressing the view that whether signature
gatherers are paid has "no bearing on.the merits of the petition being presented" to
voters); Gov. Pete Wilson's Veto Message to S.B. 1979 (Sept. 22, 1998), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_1951-2000/sb_1979_vt 199809
22.html (stating that most people being solicited do not exercise their right to inquire
into whether or not a signature gatherer is being paid, because it is irrelevant). (Both
Governors Davis and Schwarzenegger have also vetoed proposals requiring
disclosure of a paid signature-gatherer's status on the basis that these proposals are
"unnecessary" because existing law required every voter petition contain a notice
indicating voters have the right to inquire as to the signature gather's paid status. See
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 738 (Sept. 6, 2005), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0701-0750/ab_738_vt_20050
906.html; Gov. Gray Davis's Veto Message to S.B. 725 (July 30, 2001), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb_725vt_20010730.
9
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this reform proposal as deliberation-enhancing, when it clearly
seemed aimed at a far different process/integrity concern, would likely
"prove too much" and obscure the effort of this Article-and the
broader collection-to focus on significant deliberation-enhancing
reform proposals as a discrete and generally under-examined subset.
c. Veto Rationales
As noted in the introduction, five times as many initiative-reform
proposals passing both houses of the California Legislature during our
study period were vetoed as were signed into law. It is important to
understand, therefore, where recent reform efforts were derailed and
the reasons governors cited for refusing to sign these proposals into
law.21
In classifying gubernatorial-veto rationales, two of the three main
categories merited further subdivision. Some rationales were
initiative-process-reinforcing; they sought to protect the existing
process explicitly or implicitly. An example was Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger's veto of A.B. 1832, the 2010 legislation that would
have significantly raised the fee paid by initiative proponents when
submitting a draft initiative to the Attorney General for circulation to
voters (now pegged at $20022). The Governor's veto message
explicitly cited concerns the increased fee would "make it more
difficult for citizen groups to qualify an initiative."23 (These explicit
html.).
21. Of course, the official explanations may not be the entire story. Governors
may have other motivations for their vetoes. See, e.g., Laird & Macdonald, supra
note 15, at 308 (attributing Governor Davis's veto of A.B. 1245 to a desire to avoid
political controversy near the end of a close election).
22. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9001 (West 2011).
23. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 1832 (Sept. 24,
2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1801-
1850/ab 1832_vt_20100924.html. In vetoing an earlier bill, Governor
Schwarzenegger was even more rhetorically colorful in invoking a process-
reinforcing rationale. In vetoing A.B. 2946, the 2006 bill that included a provision
making it easier to invalidate petition signatures, the Governor wrote in part:
The California Constitution provides the People the right to directly enact
laws, approve amendments to the Constitution, to reject laws passed by
the legislature and signed by the Governor, and to remove those elected
from office. As envisioned by Hiram Johnson, this important democratic
268 [Vol. 47
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process-reinforcing rationales are further classified based upon
whether they focused on protecting voters, safeguarding the
prerogatives of proponents, protecting their petition circulators, or
preserving the current system generally.) Other veto rationales
provided more implicit support for the status quo, by opining that the
reform proposal was unnecessary because existing law was
sufficient24 (thus implying a desire not to saddle the current process
with additional, unneeded limitations).
As is typical in the legislative process, governors vetoed some
initiative-reform bills for reasons other than concern about their
principal substantive goals. These unrelated rationales focused on
fiscal matters ranging from concern about cost of implementation 25 to
state budgetary realities limiting the governor to high-priority bills, or
process gives the people direct control over their government and is one of
our most important means to prevent out of control special interests. This
measure is a direct assault on the Peoples right to initiative, referendum
and recall. By requiring signatures to be held invalid if a petition has any
sort of defect, this bill would allow legal technicalities to thwart the will of
hundreds of thousands of Californians who choose to sign initiative
petitions. This runs counter to the long-standing judicial policy of
applying a liberal construction to the people's power of the initiative.
Gov. Arnold Scharzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 2946 (Sept. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2946
vt_20060929.html.
24. All three California governors vetoed legislation to require paid signature-
gatherers to disclose their status, with similar arguments that this reform was
unnecessary because present California law allowed voters to ask about, and receive
an answer to, whether the petition circulator was being paid. See, e.g., Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 738 (Sept. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab 0701-0750/ab_738_vt_20050906.
html; Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to S.B. 469 (Oct. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb 0451-0500/sb_469
vt_20051007.html; Gov. Gray Davis's Veto Message to S.B. 725 (July 30, 2001),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb 725
vt_20010730.html; Gov. Gray Davis's Veto Message to S.B. 1219 (Oct. 10, 1999),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1219
vt_199910 10.html; Gov. Pete Wilson's Veto Message to S.B. 1979 (Sept. 22,
1998), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/ sb_1951-
2000/sb_1979_vt_19980922.html.
25. For example, Governor Davis cited excessive implementation costs as one
of two reasons for vetoing A.B. 1245. See Veto Message to A.B. 1245, supra note
15.
11
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on other process concerns, such as preserving executive-branch
powers.26
The veto rationales for two proposals were especially interesting.
Two different governors cited a concern that targets of the reforms
could evade the intended limitations through manipulation. In vetoing
A.B. 1245, Assembly Member Laird's bill requiring initiative
proponents to submit a draft proposal for public comment, Governor
Davis expressed a concern that appeared to echo an earlier legislative-
analyst concern-that initiative proponents would "be[ ] able to
submit essentially a 'spot' initiative . . . for posting, only to submit a
substantially different measure" to voters. 27 More recently, Governor
Schwarzenegger's 2010 veto of S.B. 1202, which would have notified
voters reading ballot pamphlets of the top five contributors to an
initiative campaign, cited concern that the bill would encourage late
contributions by contributors seeking to avoid having their
contributions count toward "top five" status.2 8 These rare
acknowledgments of the game-playing propensities of key players in
the initiative process are intriguing-in part because they are at odds
with the more typical rhetoric of supporting a favorably characterized
initiative process-so they are coded separately as "abuse-
acknowledging" rationales.29
26. Veto Message to S.B. 1208, supra note 14 (objecting to taking power out
of the hands of the Department of Finance and giving it solely to the Legislative
Analyst's Office).
27. See Report of Assembly Committee, A.B. 1245, Assemb. Comm. on
Elections and Redistricting, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Mar. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_1201-1250/ab_1245
cfa 20030328_132612_asm comm.html; Veto Message to A.B. 1245, supra note
15 ("Specifically, under this bill, I am concerned that an initiative could receive
either a negative or positive public comment while displayed on the [Secretary of
State's] web site; the proponents may then revise the initiative, but they are not
required to repost it. Consequently, the public may see one version of the initiative
prior to the election and an entirely different initiative during the election."); Laird
& Macdonald, supra note 15, at 308 (summarizing Governor's concern that
initiative proponents would employ "spot bill trick").
28. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to S.B. 1202 (Sept. 23,
2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09- 1 0/bill/sen/sb_1201-
1250/sb_1202_vt_20100923.html (claiming S.B. 1202 would "encourage late
contributions" so "[1]arge donors could avoid being included on the list").
29. Not surprisingly, vetoing governors sometimes cited multiple reasons,
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II. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REFORM THE INITIATIVE PROCESS:
TRENDS FROM THREE PERSPECTIVES
This Part examines the past fourteen years of legislative initiative-
reform efforts from three different focal lengths. Subpart A reflects on
the focus of all proposals considered at any portion of the lawmaking
process from bill introduction to enactment (called "chaptering") into
the California statute books. Subpart B focuses on, and makes
generalizations about, the thirty proposals passing both houses of the
Legislature and arriving at the Governor's desk. Subpart C divides the
subset of thirty proposals examined in the previous subpart yet further;
Subpart C compares the five proposals chaptered with the twenty-five
proposals falling victim to gubernatorial veto.
A. The Reform-Proposal Universe: Deliberation-Enhancing Ideas
and Process Reforms
Of the 87 initiative-reform proposals we identified as having been
considered in the California Legislature since 1997, 31 (or almost
36%) include proposals primarily or secondarily enhancing the ability
of interested parties and voters to understand, and deliberate on,
initiative proposals.
One of the leading deliberation-enhancing proposals has already
been mentioned: former Assembly Member John Laird's A.B. 1245,
introduced into the 2003 session of the legislature. Meriting its own,
fuller coverage in a specific article in this collection, A.B. 1245 would
have set up a process by which, prior to submitting an initiative
proposal to voters for the necessary qualifying signatures, the proposal
would be posted on an online forum supervised by the California
Secretary of State. Interested persons would then have thirty days to
comment on the proposal. At the end of this comment period,
proponents could move to the petition-circulation phase with their
original initiative proposal or with a revised proposal. Proponents
would also have been able to submit revised proposals to another
round of posting and comment.30 A.B. 1245 clearly and primarily
spanning multiple categories. See, e.g., id. (citing concerns S.B. 1202 could "create
confusion," "mislead" voters, and create "significant cost pressure to print
information that is already available at the Secretary of State website").
30. See LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST FOR A.B. 1245, supra note 15, at 1.
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sought to enhance deliberation, both by creating a forum for the
exchange of considered views between proponents and key
stakeholders and by creating a "paper trail" of information about
initiative pros and cons that could be quite useful to voters considering
whether to give initiative proposals their signatures on petitions and
their votes on election day. (Other ideas for enhancing deliberation by
triggering a public hearing include S.B. 384, a 1999 proposal that
would convene a public hearing on an initiative measure after it
receives 15% of the signatures ultimately needed to place the measure
on the ballot.31)
Other interesting proposals sought to primarily improve the
value of information to voters or their cue providers. For example,
A.B. 677 sought to prompt a panel of retired appellate judges to
develop a "nonbinding advisory opinion" about the constitutionality of
ballot-qualified initiatives; the Secretary of State would then have
summarized the opinion and included it in the official ballot
pamphlet. 32 Another information-enhancing proposal, A.B. 1500,
would have required that information about initiatives on the ballot
enter the public conversation earlier in the election cycle.3 3
31. S.B. 384, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). Although proponents
could after the hearing continue their qualification efforts without modifying the
proposal, S.B. 384 envisioned that deliberations at the public hearing might prompt
the proponent to "make nonsubstantive technical changes, such as correcting
drafting errors or making stylistic changes" or to "make substantive changes to the
text of the initiative" (in which case, the circulation process would start again). CAL.
OFFICE LEG. COUNSEL, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST FOR S.B. 384 (Mar. 17,
1999), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/
sb_384_bill_19990317_amended sen.html.
32. See A.B. 677, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998); CAL. OFFICE LEG.
COUNSEL, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST FOR A.B. 677 (Feb. 26, 1997), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab0651-0700/ab_677_bill_1997
0226_introduced.html.
33. A.B. 1500, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). As noted in the
Legislative Counsel's Digest accompanying the bill's introduction on February 23,
2001, after the Secretary of State transmits a copy of a ballot-qualified initiative
measure to the Legislature, "[e]xisting law requires each house to assign the
initiative measure to its appropriate committees, and requires the committees to hold
joint public hearings on the subject of the measure prior to the date of the election at
which the measure is to be voted upon." A.B. 1500 would have instead required
"the appropriate committees to hold the public hearings within 45 days of receipt of
the measure." CAL. OFFICE LEG. COUNSEL, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST FOR
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Other proposals did not directly aim to promote deliberation but
would nevertheless have done so by enhancing the extent of public
information on proposed initiatives or otherwise improving the ability
of voters to make sense of information. One of several examples of
this "deliberation dividend" is A.C.A. 11, a constitutional amendment
proposed by Secretary of State Debra Bowen when she served in the
California Assembly.34 A.C.A. 11 would have allowed the legislature
to consider (and pass legislation equivalent to) a proposed initiative
before it was submitted to the voters.35 Even if the legislature
ultimately declined to adopt the equivalent of the initiative, some
deliberations and debate would likely have occurred, generating a
paper trail of analysis about initiative pros, cons, and likely
implications. Voters and cue-givers could have made good use of this
enhanced information when called upon to decide whether to follow
the legislature's reticence. Similar enhancements to the public
information about initiative pros and cons would have flowed from
other proposals.36
Looking at the proposal universe empirically, Table I indicates
that ten out of eighty-seven reform proposals considered since 1997
primarily related to opportunities for deliberation during the California
A.B. 1500 (Feb. 23, 2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/asm/ab 1451-1500/ab 1500 bill 20010223 introduced.html; see also A.B.
943, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (requiring Legislative hearing on
initiative proposals 30 days before their placement on the ballot).
On a related note, S.B. 1243, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006),
sought to enhance the required public hearings triggered when initiatives qualify for
the ballot by transferring the responsibility for them from the Legislature to the
"Little Hoover" Commission on California State Government Organization and
Economy. Finally, another proposal that on its face merely transferred authority
from one state official (the Attorney General) to another (the Legislative Analyst)
could have resulted in different (and perhaps improved) information for voters
considering initiative proposals. See A.C.A. 18, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008) (transferring duty to prepare the title and summary for a proposed initiative or
referendum).
34. A.C.A. 11, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
3 5. Id.
36. See, e.g., S.C.A. 16, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (discussing
initiative process similar to Bowen's A.C.A. 11); A.C.A. 14, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enhancing the ability of voters to deal with existing information
by limiting the number of initiative measures placed on any statewide election ballot
to five).
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initiative process and another twenty one of the eighty-seven
proposals would have advanced deliberation in a secondary sense.
Combined, thirty-one reform proposals-slightly more than a third-
had some connection to deliberation.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF REFORM PROPOSALS RELATED TO
DELIBERATION, BY STAGE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
PROPOSALS PROPOSALS PROPOSALS NOT
PRIMARILY SECONDARILY MEANINGFULLY
RELATED RELATED RELATED
TOTAL OF REFORMS PROPOSED (87) 10 21 56
PROPOSALS NOT PASSING BOTH 7 16 34HOUSES (57)
PROPOSALS PASSING 3 5 22
BOTH HOUSES (30)
VETOED PROPOSALS PASSING BOTH 3 4 18
HOUSES (25)
PROPOSALS ENACTED INTO LAW (5) 0 1 4
Still, the majority of the legislative proposals considered over the
last fourteen years had no meaningful connection to deliberation.
Instead, the greater legislative concern was with paid petition
circulators, big-moneyed initiative proponents and supporters, and
other unrelated process deficiencies. This explains why, as Table II
shows, a large proportion of proposals concentrated on reforming the
direct-democracy phases preceding and including the circulation of
initiative petitions.
37. Note, the phase categories in Table 2 exceed the total number of bills. This
is because, as noted in the text accompanying notes 13 & 14, some proposals affect
multiple phases.
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TABLE 2: NUMBER OF REFORM PROPOSALS, BY PHASE OF
INITIATIVE PROCESS AFFECTED
PRE-CIRC. CIRCULATION ELECTION POST-ELECTION
PHASE PHASE PHASE PHASE
TOTAL OF REFORMS 16 48 27 2
PROPOSED (87)
PROPOSALS NOT PASSING 11 23 21 2
BOTH HOUSES (57)
PROPOSALS PASSING 5 25 6 0
BOTH HOUSES (30)
VETOED PROPOSALS PASSING 4 20 5 0
BOTH HOUSES (25)
CHAPTERED PROPOSALS 1 4 1 0
PASSING BOTH HOUSES (5)
B. Proposals Clearing Both Legislative Houses
During the period under review here, thirty reform proposals
passed both legislative houses (five were enacted into law and
governors vetoed twenty-five). Treating these reform ideas as one
package, two interesting and related trends emerge.
First, a preoccupation with reforms not related to deliberation-
the trend noted above in Part II.A-is even more pronounced when
the focus is on the subset of bills clearing both houses. As Table 1
indicates, twenty-two (over 73%) of the thirty initiative proposals
passing both houses were not meaningfully related to deliberation and
only three of the thirty proposals would have had a "direct effect" on
deliberation. One bill directly related to deliberation was A.B. 1245,
Assembly Member Laird's posting-and-comment bill summarized in
Part II.A of this Article.38 The other two were more modest. One
portion of A.B. 2946 would have struck a blow for voter
comprehension by requiring the description of an initiative proposal
on a signature petition to be understandable to the average voter.39
And S.B. 1208 would have caused a modest improvement in the
38. See supra note 15.
39. See S.B. 1208, supra note 14.
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fiscal-impact information made available to voters considering
whether to sign initiative petitions or voting on ballot-qualified
initiative proposals.40
When the focus is on proposals secondarily affecting deliberation,
five of the thirty proposals passing both houses qualify. Four relate to
providing voters indirect "cues" for evaluating the credibility of
proponents or key supporters. 4 1 A fifth pertains to the accessibility of
voter information. As chaptered on September 14, 1998, S.B. 1764
required the California Secretary of State to "disseminate the complete
state ballot pamphlet over the Internet."42 The ballot pamphlet
contains information about electoral processes and candidates and is
the official source of information and pro/con arguments about
initiative proposals. Ballot pamphlet information is also the only
source (beyond the text of initiatives) consulted by California courts
seeking to ascertain voter intent when the application of adopted
initiatives is contested in subsequent litigation.43 Thus, enhancing the
online availability of the ballot pamphlet in the "internet age"
connects to promoting deliberation, albeit indirectly and modestly.
A second, related trend is the predominant focus of reform efforts
on the process phases prior to electoral consideration of ballot-
qualified initiatives, the "pre-circulation" and "circulation" phases.
Table 2 shows that only six of the thirty proposals approved by both
legislative chambers during the fourteen year period applied beyond
the pre-circulation and circulation phases, while twenty-two (almost
40. See supra note 17 (explaining how S.B. 1208 would have a primary effect
on deliberation).
41. Three of these proposals require disclosure of "the top five contributors" to
initiative campaigns. See supra note 18. In addition, S.B. 1979 would have, in
pertinent part:
[R]equire[d] . . . any committee circulating, distributing, or mailing a
petition to show on the face of each petition in no less than 12-point bold
type, as specified, the name, street address, and city of the committee ...
[and] [i]f the committee is a controlled committee, the name of the person
or organization controlling the committee . . . to be on the face of each
petition ....
S.B. 1979, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
42. S.B. 1764, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
43. Glenn C. Smith, Solving the "Initiatory Construction" Puzzle (and
Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 262-63 (2007).
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three-quarters) of the thirty proposals applied to the circulation phase.
(This reflects, in part, the dominant legislative concern with paid-
signature-gathering.)
C. Enacted and Passed-but- Vetoed Reforms
Comparing enacted, as opposed to passed-but-vetoed, bills
provides some especially interesting contrasts. To begin with,
deliberation figured less prominently in the five enacted proposals
than in their vetoed cousins. No proposal with a primary effect on
initiative-process deliberation has been chaptered in the last fourteen
years; all three of the primary-effect proposals clearing all legislature
hurdles were vetoed." In addition, only one of the five secondary-
effect proposals to pass both houses made it into the statute books-
the relatively modest late-1990s bill requiring internet access to the
official ballot pamphlet.45 (Related trends showed up in the initiative-
process phases to which the enacted proposals applied. Only one bill,
the internet-ballot-pamphlet bill, sought to improve the election phase
of initiative deliberation.46)
The most revealing comparison between the two proposal types,
however, relates to the political dynamics behind those that succeeded
and those that did not. Table 3 breaks down the rationales invoked by
governors vetoing eighteen bills4 7 in this Article's time frame. As this
44. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
45. See S.B. 1764, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998).
46. Id. A small portion of another chaptered bill, A.B. 753, 2009-2010 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), the "code-cleanup" bill, updated existing code provisions
relating to the preparation of ballot titles and summaries for the official ballot
pamphlet. See Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 753, Assemb. Comm. on Elections and
Redistricting, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0751-0800/ab_753_cfa_20090908
204601 asm floor.html [hereinafter Bill Analysis of A.B. 753]. Although this
change related to the way initiatives would be presented to voters during the
"election" phase, for purposes of this Article, A.B. 753 is not counted as relating to
that phase because of the modest nature of the change and the bill's far greater
emphasis on pre-circulation activities. Counting A.B. 753 as contributing to the
election phase would have overstated the extent to which enacted bills focused on
the election phase.
47. Unlike the remainder of this Article, which uses the "proposal" as the basic
unit of analysis, the analysis of gubernatorial vetoes references "bills." This is
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breakdown shows, the major downfall for initiative-reform bills was a
perception that they threatened direct democracy or the major
participants in the initiative process.4 8 Governors cited one or more of
the process-reinforcing rationales in vetoing seventeen out of eighteen
bills.49 (By far the lion's share of this initiative-process-preservation
concern was invoked on behalf of initiative proponents and especially
their petition-circulation prerogatives.so)
because California's governors typically provide short, generic veto messages which
do not usually differentiate among a bill's different proposals. As a result, it is
usually difficult to determine which rationales applied to which provisions in a
multi-provision bill.
48. The categories and subcategories listed in Table 3 add to more than the
total number of proposals (eighteen) because some proposals were vetoed on
multiple bases.
49. See, e.g., Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 1068 (Oct.
12, 2009), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1051-
1100/ab_1068_vt_20091012.htm (stating Governor cannot "support limiting how
proponents of a measure negotiate a contract for gathering signatures"); Veto
Message to A.B. 1245, supra note 15 (vetoing bill based on concerns the public
should review the same version of an initiative that is submitted for election); Gov.
Pete Wilson's Veto Message to A.B. 188 (Sept. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asem/ab_0151-0200/ab_188 vt_19980930
.html (citing concerns bill would inhibit private sector involvement in ballot measure
elections). In total, veto messages for the following bills cited process-reinforcing
rationales: A.B. 1068, A.B. 1832, A.B. 436, A.B. 6, S.B. 1202, S.B. 408, A.B. 2946,
S.B. 1598, S.B. 469, A.B. 1245, A.B. 2917, S.B. 725, S.B. 1219, A.B. 188, and S.B.
1979. See infra Appendix B, pp. 288-90 (providing details on these bills).
50. See, e.g., Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's Veto Message to A.B. 6 (Oct. 11,
2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab6vt_2009
1011 .html ("I cannot support a measure that places an undue burden on reform-
minded Californians."); Veto Message to A.B. 2946, supra note 23 ("The
prohibitions on per-signature payments will make it more difficult for grass-roots
organizations to get the necessary signatures in the time allotted."). Governors
overtly invoked the need to protect proponents in vetoing three proposals-A.B.
436, A.B. 1832, and A.B. 188. Governors overtly invoked the need to protect
petition circulators in vetoing the following seven proposals: A.B. 1068, A.B. 6,
S.B. 408, A.B. 2946, S.B. 1598, S.B. 469, and A.B. 2917. See infra Appendix B, pp.
288-90 (providing details on these bills). Three proposals that governors argued
were not needed could, in theory, have complicated the petition-circulation phase.
See S.B. 725, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (requiring disclosure when
circulator is paid); S.B. 1219, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (requiring
disclosure when circulator is paid); S.B. 1979, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1997) (requiring petitions disclose contact information for ballot committees and
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TABLE 3: VETO RATIONALES, BY RATIONALE CATEGORY, FOR
EIGHTEEN VETOED PROPOSALS
Number of Bills Vetoed
(at least in part) On This Basis
Initiative-Process- Reinforcing Rationale: 2Protecting Voters
Initiative-Process- Reinforcing Rationale: 3Protecting Proponents
Initiative-Process- Reinforcing Rationale:
Protecting Petition Circulators and 7
Circulation Process
Initiative-Process- Reinforcing Rationale: 5Implicit (Reform is Unnecessary)
Unrelated Rationale: Fiscal Concerns 4
Unrelated Rationale: Non-Fiscal Concerns 1
Unrelated Rationale: Abuse-Acknowledging 2
The importance to a reform proposal's success of avoiding a
perceived attack on the initiative process is underscored by looking in
the opposite direction-at the absence of system threats in the five
chaptered bills. Other than the one adopted bill that is "mostly non-
substantive" (i.e., A.B. 753, the 2009 "code clean-up measure"
sponsored by Secretary of State Debra Bowen "to reorganize, update,
and clarify the Elections Code provisions regarding ballot labels,
titles, and summaries""), the remaining four adopted bills,
summarized in the rest of this paragraph, enhance prerogatives of
existing direct-democracy participants. Two such proposals are voter
friendly: A.B. 1134 makes it easier for voters to withdraw the
disclosure when circulator is paid).
51. Bill Analysis of A.B. 753, supra note 46, at 2.
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signatures they earlier lent to an initiative petition and A.B. 1717
makes ballot pamphlets available online, giving tech-savvy voters
another way to access official ballot proposal information.5 2 A third
chaptered bill modestly expands the ranks of persons who can serve as
ballot-petition circulators. 53
A last proposal appears at first blush to run counter to this
process-enhancing trend. A.B. 2101 amended an existing law to allow
a court, as a condition of parole, to prohibit a defendant who violated
election rules from serving as a paid signature gatherer.54 This modest
incursion on unfettered signature gathering, however, seems to show
that concerns for protecting direct-democracy and voters can
predominate.
52. A.B. 1134, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); A.B. 1717, 2009-2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). A.B. 1134 responded to a 2007 recall petition in the
City of Carson, in which "[i]n addition to the recall petition, there was an active
signature withdrawal campaign run, urging people who had signed the petition to
submit signature withdrawal cards to have their signatures removed from the
original petition." Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 1134, Assemb. Comm. on Elections and
Redistricting, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (May 4, 2009), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1101-1 150/ab 1134_cfa_2009
0504_092356 asm comm.html [hereinafter Bill Analysis of A.B. 1134]. When a
court decision imposed an "extra hurdle" on voter-signature withdrawal, id. at 2,
Assembly Member Mendoza successfully carried this bill to reverse the court ruling.
See LEG. COUNSEL STATE CAL., OFF. BILL HISTORY OF A.B. NO. 1134, 2009-2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (2009), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/
asm/ab_1101-1 150/ab_1134_bill_20091011_history.html.
53. See Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 904, S. Comm. on Elections and
Reapportionment, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Apr. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb 0901-0950/sb_904_cfa_20010405
122306 sen comm.html. S.B. 904 would have required circulators be eligible to
register. Id. This would have expanded previous law requiring petition circulators be
registered voters. Id. S.B. 904 sought to "conform[ ] [an unenforceable] California
law regarding eligibility of petition circulators to the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation [525 U.S. 182 (1999)]." Id.
54. See Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 2101, Assembly Floor, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess., at 1 (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/asm/ab 2101-2150/ab 2101_cfa_20100811_183301_asm floor.html.
55. See id. at 2 (quoting author's concerns that "bounty" paid to signature
gatherers encourages them to "mislead voters" and to cause voters to sign petitions
"without disclosing to the voter what those petitions would do").
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III. THE FUTURE OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF CALIFORNIA'S DIRECT
DEMOCRACY
With the past as prologue, it is now possible to look ahead to the
future. Part III of this Article does this by (A) providing some
preliminary notes on the prospects for direct-democracy reform in the
current California legislative session and (B) drawing some
conclusions about the lessons future reformers can learn from the last
fourteen years.
A. The Climate for Legislative Reform in 2011-2012: An Update
One obvious development this legislative session is a change in
the party and person occupying the California Governorship.
Governor Jerry Brown did not comment on initiative reform during
his election campaign. And other, less direct, signals about the
strength of the Governor's support for the initiative process are
equivocal. During his campaign, Governor Brown emphasized the
importance of popular sovereignty by promising not to raise taxes
"unless the people themselves actually vote for them."5 6 As Attorney
General, however, Brown refused to defend Proposition 8, both when
challengers argued that the initiative was contrary to the California
Constitution's limitations on fundamental constitutional change57 and
when litigation challenged it on federal constitutional grounds. 8
Whether these and other stances on particular initiatives transcend
substantive specifics and indicate Governor Brown will be less
protective of the initiative process compared to previous governors-
56. David Siders, Ballot Watch: Fixing the State Budget, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 23, 2010, at 4A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2010/10/23/3125657/
ballot-watch-fixing-the-state.html.
57. See Respondents' Preliminary Response to Petition for Extraordinary
Relief at 6, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), 2008 WL 5516861. Indeed,
rather than simply fail to defend Proposition 8 in Strauss, Brown's office actively
participated in oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Strauss, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/prop8-transcript
.pdf.
58. See Attorney General's Memorandum in Response to Court's Inquiry Into
the Attorney General's Role in the Initiative Process, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), 2010 WL 197613.
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and more welcoming of reform-remains to be seen. In part, this
depends on whether Brown will follow the recent pattern of vetoing
initiative reform bills in order to preserve direct democracy or provide
another potential check on the Legislature. Recent governors have
used the initiative process to attempt to circumvent the Legislature and
promote their legislative agendas. Governor Pete Wilson did this by
attaching himself to Proposition 187.59 Similarly, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger often took sides or backed initiatives through his
"California Dream Team."60 Governor Brown may similarly want to
preserve this option by remaining skeptical about initiative reform.
However, the mixed record of success and adverse political fallout
from past gubernatorial effortS6 1 to circumvent the legislature by using
59. See Pete Wilson, Former Governor of California, Remarks to The Hudson
Institute, Illegal Immigration: Past, Present, and Future (June 12, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=hudsonupcoming
events&id=261).
60. See No on 27, CAL. DREAM TEAM, http://sites.activatedirect.com/www.
joinamold.com/issues/detail.php?_c=zjkom5wanidxfo&id=z5a3ab5wfjlg0l (last
visited Mar. 31, 2011); No on 23, CAL. DREAM TEAM, http://sites.activatedirect.com/
www.joinarnold.com/issues/detail.php?_c=zjkom5wanidxfo&id=z5a367r3O7dewo
(last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
61. Governor Wilson may have achieved a short-term benefit to his own re-
election campaign in his support of the Proposition 187. (Some political observers
credit that support for a successful come-from-behind reelection win. See, e.g., John
Marelius, Governor; U.S. Senate; Constitutional Office; Ballot Measures, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 1994, at 1) However, courts later overturned
Proposition 187 on federal constitutional grounds. League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 771 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding provisions of
Proposition 187 denying illegal immigrants benefits and services granted to them
under federal law were preempted and granting initiative opponents a preliminary
injunction), aff'd, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (9th Cir. 1997). And many associate Wilson's
and the Republican Party's support of Proposition 187 with the decline of the Party
in California due to alienating a growing and increasingly active group of Latino
voters. See, e.g., Carla Marinucci, Reaching Out to State Latinos/Bush Distances
Himself From Pete Wilson, SFGATE.COM (Apr. 8, 2000), http://articles.sfgate.com/
2000-04-08/news/17642940_1_latino-voters-illegal-immigration-bush-
administration.
Governor Schwarzenegger and his "Dream Team" achieved some notable
successes in supporting initiatives. See GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER'S CAL.
DREAM TEAM: A BALLOT MEASURE COMM., JOINARNOLD.COM, http://www.
joinarnold.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). (Especially important among the fourteen
out of twenty-five Dream-Team-supported initiatives is Proposition 11, which took
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the initiative process may have tarnished the appeal of direct-
democracy as a Governor's friend, and opposing concerns about the
adverse budgetary and political fallout from the initiative process may
come to the fore.
Whichever scenario emerges, the current legislative session also
includes a newly reelected Secretary of State with a track record for
proposing initiative changes both in her prior term of office,62 and in
her previous role as a member of the State Legislature.63 In addition,
there will be no lack of initiative-reform proposals; several proposals
have already been introduced in the 2011-2012 legislative session.
Most notably, Assembly Member Mike Gatto introduced the
following five ambitious constitutional amendments this legislative
session:
A.C.A. 6, which would require initiatives imposing new costs on
the State or on local governments to provide sufficient funding
sources in the initiative itself;
A.C.A. 9, which would require initiatives imposing supermajority
requirements on government policymaking to be passed by a
supermajority;
A.C.A. 10, which would allow the Legislature to amend an
initiative which has been in place for four years;
A.C.A. 11, which would increase the signature requirements to
qualify initiatives; and
redistricting out of the hands of the Legislature and empowered an independent
commission to do this politically significant task. Cal. Proposition 11: Redistricting.
Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, reprinted in California Ballot
Pamphlet 137-40 (2008), available at http://traynor.uchastings.eduiballot_pdf/
2008g.pdf (codified at CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2).) On the other hand, despite
considerable investment of personal political capital, Schwarzenegger failed to
convince voters to adopt five out of the six initiatives he supported in 2009 to deal
with California's looming budget crisis. See California Online Voter Guide - 2009,
CAL. VOTER FOUNDATION (May 8, 2009), http://www.calvoter.org/voter/
elections/2009/special/props/index.html. Some observers argue that
Schwarzenegger's failure to end-run the Legislature via direct democracy may have
compromised his subsequent efforts to work with legislators on budget solutions.
62. See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing Assembly Member
Bowen's sponsorship of "code clean-up" measure).
63. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 34-35 (discussing then-Assembly
Member Bowen's sponsoring of A.C.A. 11).
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A.C.A. 12, which would require the Legislature to hold hearings
on ballot initiatives before they go to the ballot; the Legislature could
propose amendments to the initiative, which proponents could then
accept or not.
Most of Assembly Member Gatto's proposals follow the pattern
of previous bills. Three of the five are not primarily or secondarily
related to deliberation in the initiative process. A.C.A. 9 and 11 would
make it harder for an initiative to qualify or become law, and A.C.A.
10 would allow the Legislature to counteract the effects of initial voter
deliberations. However, two of the five are related to deliberation.
A.C.A. 6 would primarily further deliberation by generating new
information for voters about the fiscal implications of proposed
initiatives. Similarly, A.C.A. 12 is a process reform that would
provide a "deliberation dividend" because the enhanced legislative
hearings regarding initiative measures would generate new
information. (As with past efforts to reform direct democracy through
constitutional amendment, these proposals face special political
hurdles. The Legislature would have to pass them by two-thirds vote
margins and then they would need to be approved by a majority of
voters64).
B. Drawing Lessons From the Past: The Advantages ofFocusing on
Deliberation Reforms and Framing Them as
Direct-Democracy Friendly
What lessons can California legislators (and perhaps executive
branch reformers) draw from the recent era of initiative-process
64. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § § 1, 4. The California Constitution distinguishes
between constitutional amendments and constitutional revisions. Compare CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, §1, with CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §2. Constitutional revisions are
changes to the California Constitution that "fundamental[ly]" change the "basic
governmental plan or framework." Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 99 (Cal. 2009).
Constitutional amendments, on the other hand, are changes that "simply change[]
the substantive content of a state constitution." Id. Both constitutional amendments
and constitutional revisions require voter approval. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2.
However, constitutional amendments may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of the
California Legislator or signatures equal to 8% of the votes cast for all candidates
for governor at the gubernatorial election, while a constitutional revision requires a
constitutional convention or a two-thirds vote by the legislator followed by majority
approval. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2, 4.
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reform? A first take-away is that reformers must maximize efforts to
frame their proposals as neutral toward-and, even better, beneficial
for-direct democracy. This reflects lessons drawn from gubernatorial
veto rationales (with their emphasis on stopping perceived anti-
initiative-process threats) and from the absence of anti-direct-
democracy taints in proposals ultimately enacted.65 Further, the very
reasons why many California legislators naturally resist the direct-
democracy alternative will likely cause a special cloud of suspicion to
form over reform efforts that originate from the state capitol.
These observations suggest that reformers would do well to focus
more of their exertions on proposals that enhance initiative-system
deliberation, especially in the election phase of the process. This shift
of emphasis is an appropriate response to the general failure of past
efforts largely focused elsewhere. And, beyond the simple wisdom of
trying something different, deliberation-enhancing reforms are the
easiest to characterize as direct-democracy neutral (or even direct-
democracy supportive)-thus heeding the first lesson. Proponents of
reforms for this phase can argue that their proposals do not delay or
complicate the process of submitting initiative proposals to citizen-
legislators. Instead, as opposed to proposals making it harder to
qualify initiative proposals for the ballot or to pass proposals once
they do qualify, deliberation-enhancing proposals accept the current
rules of direct-democracy and seek to make the existing process more
meaningful. Avoiding an anti-direct-democracy taint thus seems
especially feasible for reforms aimed at this so-far-deemphasized
election phase.
A case can be made, of course, that meaningful direct-democracy
reforms are inevitably doomed to fail-a veritable "third rail" of
California politics-and perhaps all reform proposals are vulnerable to
simplistic sloganeering that the proponent is trying to weaken direct
democracy.66 In combination with the power of initiative-industry
65. See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the success of A.B. 753
based on its characterization as a non-substantive "clean-up" measure); notes 52-53
and accompanying text (discussing the success of "voter friendly" bills A.B. 1134
and S.B. 904 which would have made it easier for voters to withdraw their
signatures and expanded who can serve as ballot-petition circulators respectively).
Of course, as with all legislation, idiosyncratic political and practical reasons may be
part of the recipe for success for some of the reform proposals eventually adopted.
66. See, e.g., Veto Message to A.B. 2946, supra note 23 ("[Mlaking the
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lobbyists, this could continue the trend of the last fourteen years-in
which the majority of reform proposals will die within legislative halls
and most of those emerging from the capitol will fall victim to the
gubernatorial veto pen.
But there is an alternative scenario. A combination of changed
political dynamics and a renewed emphasis on deliberation
enhancement can significantly increase the odds that the California
Legislature will pass real initiative reform. Indeed, the chaptering of
A.B. 1134, the reform proposal making it easier for voters to withdraw
their initial assent to a petition, shows how voter-empowering changes
can trump concerns about the prerogatives of initiative proponents. (It
is telling that the author of the measure expressly lamented imposing
an "extra hurdle" on voters that "would unfairly benefit proponents of
the initiative and any company hired to collect signatures on their
behalf."6 7 ) This suggests that reform proposals apparently and
actually enhancing voter autonomy and deliberation can carry the
day!68
process more difficult may be fine for those opposed to the initiative process or
those who profit from it, but it is not for everyday Californians with an idea for
reform.")
67. Bill Analysis of A.B. 1134, supra note 52, at 2 (Comment 1) (attributing
quoted statement to sponsoring Assembly Member Mendoza).
68. As noted earlier, an impulse to protect voters from manipulation and to
ensure their assent was meaningful also appeared to trump deference to proponents
and their signature gatherers in another chaptered bill, A.B. 2101. See supra text
accompanying notes 54-55.
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APPENDIX D: 34 NON-DELIBERATION-ENHANCING
INITIATIVE-REFORM PROPOSALS
NOT PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE LEGISLATURE
(by Initiative-Process Phase Affected, Topic, Legislative Session, and Bill
Number)
I. PRE-CIRCULATION PHASE (6 PROPOSALS)
A. PROPOSALS CHANGING THE SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSED INITIATIVES
* ACA 14 ('01-'02; Hertzberg-D) (tightened single-subject
rule to require that all initiative provisions be "functionally
related and reasonably germane to each other")
*SCA 15 ('99-'00; Murray-D) (tightened single-subject rule to
require that each by initiative provision be "germane to the
specific objective or purpose of the measure" and "functionally
interdependent with all other provisions")
*SCA 5 ('97-'98; Karnette-D) (tightened single-subject rule to
require that each initiative provision be reasonably germane to
the general objective or purpose of the measure" and
"reasonably interdependent with all other provisions")
B. PROPOSALS CHANGING THE PROCESS FOR PROPOSING INITIATIVES
*AB 935 ('97-'98; Vincent-D; original version) (extended time
for gathering petition signatures)
*AB 935 ('97-'98; Vincent-D; final version) (required
proponent to certify to Attorney General that proposed
measure has been reviewed by legal counsel legal for "legal
form, clarity of language, and proper drafting style")
*SB 1449 ('97-'98; Thompson-D) (required that proposed
initiatives be sent for Legislative Counsel review; in
confidential memorandum, Legislative Counsel could
recommend "technical, nonsubstantive amendments consistent
with the policy and intent of the measure")
II. CIRCULATION PHASE (21 PROPOSALS)
A. PROPOSALS REFORMING PAID-SIGNATUREGATHERING (10
PROPOSALS)
39
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1. Proposals Prohibiting Per-Signature Payments for Signature
Gatherers
*SB 1047 ('05-'06; Bowen-D; included in amended version of bill)
*AB 980 ('01-'02; Pavley-D; included in original version)
*AB 73 ('97-'98; Bordonaro-R; included in original version)
*AB 1359 ('97-'98; Bowen-D; included in original version;
provision deleted during amendment in Assembly) (also
required proponent submission to state officials of information
re: paid circulators)
2. Proposals Requiring Signature Gatherers to Disclose Whether They
Are Being Paid
*AB 1236 ('01-'02; Jackson-D)
*SB 1219 ('99-'00; Schiff-D)
*AB 1233 ('97-'98; Granlund-R)
3. Other Reform Proposals
*SB 1203 ('09-'10; DeSaulnier-D) (required signature gatherer
to wear badge)
*AB 980 ('0 1-'02; Pavley-D; final version) (allowed payment
of circulators by commission, but limited payment to $5,000
per election cycle)
*AB 73 ('97-'98; Bordonaro-R; final version) (required paid
signature gatherers to obtain permit from Secretary of State)
B. PROPOSALS REFORMING SIGNATURE GATHERING MORE
GENERALLY (7 PROPOSALS)
*AB 1914 ('07-'08; Torrico-D) (imposed civil liability on
proponents knowingly failing to report violations to Secretary
of State; required proponents to notify signatories of
misconduct related to petitions and offer signers an
opportunity to withdraw signature)
*AB 2459 ('05-'06; Oropeza-D) (sought to prevent out-of-
state petition circulators with only short-term association with
state, by requiring circulators to be registered or eligible to
vote in most recent state election)
*AB 667 ('0 1-'02; Cox-R) (required state to reimburse
counties for cost of verifying signatures on initiative petitions)
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*AB 1351 ('01-'02; Cardoza-R) (prevented'signatures on
petitions from being declared invalid when voter moves to
another precinct)
*AB 1371 ('01-'02; Cardoza-R) (prevented signatures on
petitions from being declared invalid due to technical
irregularities in officially required declarations by petition
circulators)
*AB 439 ('99-'00; Peschetti-R) (included in original version;
provision deleted when final bill was chaptered) (required state
to reimburse cities and counties for cost of verifying signatures
on initiative petitions)
*AB 935 ('97-'98; Vincent-D; original version) (extended time
for gathering petition signatures from 150 days to 175 days)
C. PROPOSALS CHANGING SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS (4 PROPOSALS)
*AB 943 ('07-'08; Calderon-D) (raised 8% requirement for
initiatives amending state constitution to 10%)
*ACA 6 ('07-'08; Calderon-D) (same)
*ACA 18 ('05-'06; Nation-D) (raised 8% requirement for
initiatives amending state constitution to 16%; raised 5%
requirement for initiative statutes to 10%; required signatures
to be broadly distributed through at least thirty counties)
*AB 1233 ('97-'98; Granlund-R) (required that existing 5%
requirement for initiative statutes and 8% requirement for
initiatives amendment state constitution to be based on number
of registered voters, not actual voters; has effect of
substantially increasing signature requirements)
III. ELECTION PHASE (5 PROPOSALS)
A. PROPOSALS CHANGING VOTE MARGINS FOR INITIATIVE
PROPOSAL/PASSAGE (4 PROPOSALS)
*ACA 21 ('09-'10; Calderon-D; included in original version)
(required 2/3 vote for initiatives changing state constitution)
*ACA 21 ('09-'10; Calderon-D; final version) (lowered
percentage of Legislature needed to propose constitutional
amendments from 2/3 to simple majority; thus, made
Legislature's authority to propose constitutional amendments
same as initiative proponents' authority)
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*ACA 26 ('09-'10; Calderon-D) (required initiative proposals
to pass by the same vote margin they require for Legislative
amendments to initiative provisions)
*SCA 22 ('05-'06; Murray-D) (required 2/3 vote for initiatives
changing state constitution)
B. PROPOSAL RESTRICTING THE ELECTIONS FOR WHICH INITIATIVES
CAN APPEAR ON THE BALLOT
*ACA 34 ('05-'06; Umberg-D) (prevented initiatives or
referenda from being voted on at the same election at which
there is a presidential primary election)
IV. POST-ENACTMENT PHASE (2 PROPOSALS)
*ACA 38 ('05-'06; DeVore-R) (granted California Supreme
Court sole jurisdiction over litigation challenging enacted
initiatives)
*AB 1181 ('99-'00; Frusetta-R) (granted California appellate
courts jurisdiction over litigation challenging enacted
initiatives)
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